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community-based strategies
Niamh Garvey and Peter Newell
This paper investigates how, why, and when community-based strategies are effective in pro-
moting corporate accountability (CA) to the poor. It argues that mainstream approaches to cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) underestimate the importance of power in the relationship
between corporations and the communities in which they invest, which limits their applicability
to many developing-country contexts in particular. In addressing this neglect, the article draws
on literature on power, accountability, and citizen participation in order to analyse cases
where communities have attempted to hold corporations to account for their social and environ-
mental responsibilities. The paper argues that more attention should be paid to a number of
state-, corporation-, and community-related factors, which are found to be key to the effective-
ness of strategies aimed at enhancing CA to the poor.
Introduction
This paper seeks to identify the conditions under which community-based strategies for corpor-
ate accountability (CA) appear to be effective in engendering a greater element of accountabil-
ity on the part of corporations to communities in which they invest regarding the social and
environmental impacts of their investments. In this context, effectiveness will be taken to
mean whether the mechanisms of accountability are successful in (a) improving the responsive-
ness of corporations to community demands, gauged in terms of a change in practice as opposed
to rhetorical shifts; and (b) increasing the representation of previously marginalised groups
through increasing their accessibility to or inclusion in decisions affecting their lives. The
paper contributes to debates about the role of the private sector in development and more gen-
erally to contemporary concerns with corporate social—and environmental—responsibility
(CSR). We argue, however, that the mainstream CSR discourse pays insufficient attention to
the politics of corporate accountability and the influence of power on how mechanisms of
accountability and spaces for citizen participation in CSR initiatives work in practice.
Our study focuses on the ways in which people resist corporate misconduct as opposed to the
many cases of ‘best practice’ that are well covered in the literature on CSR and highlighted in
policy initiatives such as Business Partners for Development (Long and Arnold 1995;
Schmidheiny 1992; BPD 2001). It also draws on many examples that pre-date the contemporary
Western-oriented framing of the CSR debate. What may be labelled CSR issues today are often
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a product of many decades of conflict over resources that constitute ongoing historical struggles
for corporate and state accountability and should be understood in this context. The paper ana-
lyses cases in which communities have attempted to hold corporations accountable for the ways
in which their actions impinge upon livelihood issues such as land rights, access to resources,
and occupational health and environmental concerns across a range of sectors, including
mining, forestry, oil extraction, and waste dumping. It therefore goes beyond the popular,
but narrower, framing of CSR as responsible management of environmental outputs and
respect for basic labour standards at the workplace. The paper draws on evidence from 46
case studies, but the broader argument draws upon trends observed in over 80 cases. These
are predominantly from Southern settings, but also include examples from poor communities
in the North, given that many of the problems faced by communities in holding corporations
to account result from poverty and inequality rather than geographical location. Combining
lessons from the conceptual framework with analysis of the cases, we argue that a number of
‘state-related’, ‘company-related’, and ‘community-related’ factors are key to understanding
the effectiveness of community-based strategies for corporate accountability.
Though the relationship between multinational companies and poorer communities in the
developing world clearly has a long history, the changing relationship between states,
corporations, and communities over the last decade has meant that transnational
companies (TNCs) and the poor encounter one another with increasing frequency and inten-
sity. TNCs have increased in size and reach such that approximately 60,000 TNCs and
500,000 foreign affiliates invest more than US$600 billion abroad annually and control
two thirds of international trade, making them ‘central organizers of the emerging global
economy’ (Hansen 2002:159). During the 1990s foreign direct investment (FDI) became
increasingly important relative to official aid flows to developing countries (see the article
by Andrew Sumner in this issue). As part of this trend, it is the transnationalisation
of resource extraction in particular that brings TNCs into contact with communities. As
Lund-Thomsen (2003:2) notes:
Encouraged by market- and foreign investment-led philosophies, developing countries
have liberalised mining and investment laws as well as rewritten their tax codes to facili-
tate the participation of TNCs in their mineral economies. Combined with technological
advances and favourable metal prices, new regions have been opened for mineral explora-
tion by TNCs. This development has inevitably brought TNCs into conflict with local
communities.
Parallel to this, there has been a general shift away from the ‘command-and-control’ regulatory
role of the state that characterised approaches to social and environmental regulation of TNCs
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, towards more informal, voluntary, and corporate self-regu-
lation. Supportive of this move, mainstream multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as a
growing number of business associations and NGOs, have increasingly sought to portray
TNCs as important partners in delivering ‘sustainable development’. DFID, for example,
refers to the ‘key role’ corporations play ‘in making globalization work better for poor
people’ (DFID 2000:59). Corporate voluntarism and strategies of partnership, which are at
the heart of mainstream CSR approaches, are regarded as ‘win-win’, whereby the social and
environmental performance of the firm is increased and corporations benefit from increased effi-
ciency, productivity, and enhanced reputation.
In contrast to this laissez-faire approach to business regulation, critics have regarded the
growing power of TNCs as a threat to democratic governance in situations where the
global mobility and rights that companies have acquired are not matched by systems of
regulation to govern their activities. While trade and investment agreements increase the
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entry and exit rights of TNC investors, critics argue that, in contrast, the social and environ-
mental responsibilities of TNCs are underdeveloped. The mobility that allows companies in
some sectors to relocate more easily, playing governments and workers off against one
another in an effort to secure the best terms, is particularly undermining of the ability of
poorer communities to make accountability demands of such companies. This is in addition,
of course, to broader substantive differences in power assets and capabilities between corpor-
ations and communities. While corporations secure access to decision making and privilege
through their tax contribution to state resources, and to economic development more generally
by providing employment, the communities in which many TNCs invest are often far removed
from the centres of political power as well as being economically marginalised. Given the
growing emphasis among official donors on the positive role of corporations in delivering sus-
tainable development, it is important to understand the nature of accountability relations
between companies and communities in settings which are more familiar to the majority of
the world’s people than are the situations of partnership and engagement that are emphasised
in mainstream CSR literatures.
From responsibility to accountability
Various terms have emerged to express the rights and obligations of corporations. Corporate
governance refers to policies and practices used to regulate internal relationships and fulfil
responsibilities to investors and other stakeholders. Corporate accountability often refers, in
a managerial sense, to issues of disclosure, auditing, and monitoring of business practices. Cor-
porate social responsibility implies a more discretionary act on the part of companies as they
consider their role and impact across a wide range of corporate activities. Lastly, corporate citi-
zenship positions corporations as ‘citizens’ with claims to the entitlements that flow from citi-
zenship (Newell 2002). Unlike understandings of CA as management practice, we are more
concerned here with the political content of accountability relationships. This more political
interpretation of accountability chimes with traditional preoccupations about ‘how to keep
power under control, . . . how to prevent its abuse, how to subject it to certain procedures
and rules of conduct’ (Schedler 1999:13). Central to this definition of accountability are the
concepts of ‘answerability’, an obligation to provide an account of one’s actions and inactions;
and ‘enforceability’, namely mechanisms for realising that obligation and sanctioning its non-
fulfilment where necessary (Schedler 1999).
Understanding accountability in these terms, it becomes possible to see that while there has
been an increase in answerability as increasing numbers of firms feel obliged to validate their
actions to wide circles of stakeholders and those affected by their activities, mechanisms of
meaningful answerability are often weak and underdeveloped (Newell 2003). From this per-
spective, mainstream CSR approaches have a number of limitations. First, many of the
debates on CSR focus on initiatives such as voluntary codes of conduct and standards, and
public–private partnerships (PPPs). Relatively little attention is focused on the strategies that
communities themselves undertake to demand CA. The focus is on voluntarism from above
rather than rights from below.
Second, while the existing literature helps to identify some of the pressures driving compa-
nies’ answerability to communities, there is insufficient emphasis on how the importance of
these factors may vary according to sectoral, political, and cultural contexts. For example,
the vulnerability of different companies to these pressures varies according to which markets
companies are producing for and, in turn, whether concerned customers in those markets
have sufficient purchasing power to bring about a change in company behaviour.
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A third problem is that the emphasis on partnership and negotiation is apolitical, and thereby
lacks a theory of power. For example, the World Bank describes how ‘communities take their
place at the negotiating table along with regulators and factory managers’ (World Bank 2000:3),
without any discussion of the range of challenges that communities may face in securing access
for their place and being able to realise the advantages it confers. Power dynamics continue to
be important even once a supposedly equal place at the table has been negotiated. A focus on
negotiation, joint agenda setting, and partnership suggests that all agendas can be accommo-
dated, something which assumes a position of leverage on behalf of the community with the
capacity and confidence to participate effectively. It also overlooks the strategies that can be
employed by the powerful to control the agenda and frame the issues in ways that deny
spaces for opposition. As Peter Utting acknowledges, CSR ‘is not simply a technical issue of
know-how, resource availability, “win-win” situations or even greater environmental awareness
on the part of key decision makers’, but rather it is a political process ‘involving power struggles
between different actors and stakeholders’ (Utting 2002a:277).
Our analysis starts from the assumption that struggles for CA are essentially contests of
power between actors with competing agendas and very different capabilities, and seeks to
understand the conditions under which community-based strategies are effective. To assess
this, we consider the extent to which different strategies promote corporate responsiveness
‘from above’, and the extent to which changes ‘from below’ facilitate greater representation
of previously excluded citizens through increasing access and inclusion in decisions affecting
their lives. It is therefore not just change in company behaviour to accommodate citizens’
demands that is significant, but changes in structures of representation that may allow for the
expression of future accountability demands. We locate our analysis of the relationship
between companies and communities within a broader ‘web’ of accountability relationships,
which also involve states, NGOs, and international institutions, often pulling in competing
directions. CA to the poor may therefore be influenced by the degree to which community inter-
ests conflate or conflict with the interests of other actors within these accountability ‘webs’. The
following section analyses community-based strategies for CA drawn from 46 case studies
in order to demonstrate how factors relating to governments, companies, and communities
influence the effectiveness of those strategies.
State-related factors
A number of state-related factors are key to the effectiveness of community-based strategies for
CA. Government policies and legal frameworks protect and promote the relative rights and
responsibilities of companies and communities. A government’s willingness and ability to
implement sanctions influence the extent to which these are realised in practice. While it is
acknowledged that citizen strategies aimed at changing a corporation’s behaviour are often a
response to the ineffectiveness of the state in ensuring implementation of regulations regarding
corporate activity (World Bank 2000), states also directly influence the effectiveness of
community-based strategies.
Their control over resources means that states often determine the access of a corpor-
ation or community to the resources over which accountability struggles are commonly
fought. Their regulatory role affords governments influence over the levels of ‘downward’
accountability required of companies. In a basic sense, states can both provide incentives
and disincentives to CSR actions by establishing legal requirements and investment con-
ditions for companies that operate in their jurisdiction. Company laws can require disclos-
ure of information on social and environmental performance to investors as well as
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determine levels of protection for workers and also set acceptable standards of environ-
mental pollution.
Drawing on factors that have emerged from analysis of the case studies, we would argue that
five state-related factors are key to understanding the effectiveness of community-based
strategies for CA. These are:
. the nature of the state–corporation relationship;
. the nature of the state–community relationship;
. state vulnerability to pressures from international groups;
. the availability of information and transparency; and
. the legal framework—its enforcement and accessibility.
These factors affect strategies in different ways, and are essential in understanding why some
strategies may be adopted by certain communities and not others, and why they may be success-
ful in some contexts and not in others.
The relationship between states and corporations takes on different forms in different parts of
the world and is subject to change in a context of globalisation. On the one hand, states have the
formal power to regulate corporate activities and to implement sanctions against non-compli-
ance. Pratt and Fintel (2002) also found that government fiscal and financial policies influenced
CSR in practice in Costa Rica and El Salvador. They argue that in these contexts government
policies undermined CSR through subsidising and endorsing the unsustainable use of natural
resources, just as a lack of human and financial resources may also undermine the capacities
of governments actively to enforce laws regarding corporate disclosure, for example (Utting
2002a:268). Conversely, Hanks (2002) found that in South Africa the threat of punitive state
actions, the political independence of relevant state authorities, and the provision of high-
quality information flows promoted greater CSR. Often, however, these conditions are
lacking. In order to attract FDI, governments frequently offer a range of concessions to
business. These may run counter to citizens’ demands for ‘responsible’ investment. The econ-
omic crisis in Kenya, for example, led the government to side with Tiomin Inc., a Canadian
mining company seeking to acquire surface rights in order to establish strip mining for titanium
in Kwale in the south of the country. In order to attract investment, the Kenyan government
offered substantial incentives to business, which limited the potential benefits accruing to the
community (Ojiambo 2002:8). In this way the government helped to generate opposition to
the investment, as the campaign focused not on opposing the mine as such but to ‘ensure
responsible investment that does not lead to environmental degradation and that upholds com-
munity rights’ (Ojiambo 2002:14).
In some cases, state support to corporations depends less on this attempt to balance national
‘development’ goals with local interests, but rather stems from the direct financial benefit accru-
ing to government officials. The huge rents that Nigerian military governments have received
over a number of decades from Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta, for example, served to
strengthen government resolve to silence local activists campaigning against the environmental
and social impacts of oil extraction (Okonta and Douglas 2001). In Indonesia, the links between
local officials and logging companies led to the granting of many illegal logging permits for
companies to undertake commercial logging in the protected Biosphere reserve of Siberut
Island, despite the opposition of local Mentawai communities (DTE 2001).
Once concessions have been granted, governments are often reluctant to countenance claims
of negligence raised by communities in which a company invests. Particularly when dependent
upon a particular industry, there are added incentives not to jeopardise investment and the wider
ramifications that doing so may have in terms of discouraging other potential investors. Ecua-
dor’s dependence on oil revenues for approximately 40–50 per cent of export income led the
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government to oppose legal action by communities against the oil company Texaco in 1993.
The government presented a diplomatic protest to the US government in an attempt to stop
the legal case against Texaco being held there, fearing that it would discourage future
foreign investment in Ecuador, even after the company had left (Kimmerling 1996).
Moreover, even where states are willing to use sanctions, they may be unable to implement
them against more powerful TNCs. In January 1999, the US-based Delta & Pine Land
Company ignored a Paraguayan court order to remove 660 tons of cottonseed that it
had dumped in the rural community of Rinco´ni in November 1998. The seeds had been treated
with toxic compounds, and adequate precautions had not been taken by the company in the hand-
ling of the materials, in the protection of the subsoil, or in the protection of community inhabitants.
Medical testing found a number of cases of acute pesticide poisoning among residents. The state
was unable to enforce a legal ruling against the company (Greenpeace International 2002:60). But
in July 2004, the courts ruled in favour of the Rinco´ni farmers and against a senior agricultural
engineer held directly responsible for the dumping (Amorı´n and Iglesias 2004).
Relations between a state and community are key to determining the level of state protection
a community can expect. Communities are more likely to be the victims of industrial pollution,
for example, where they are weakly organised and discriminated against in industrial policy.
Such discrimination can manifest itself in racialised planning decisions regarding the location
of hazardous production sites such as toxic-waste facilities and nuclear power plants (McDonald
2002). There is a large body of literature describing this trend as ‘environmental racism’ (Cole
and Foster 2002). In the Californian towns of Kettleman City and Buttonwillow, for instance,
decisions favoured the siting of incinerators and toxic-waste facilities in predominantly Latino
areas, rather than in other predominantly white towns in Kings County and Kern County (Cole
and Foster 2002). Local communities felt ill-informed about proposed developments, and
believed they had been deliberately targeted for industrial development that other, wealthier,
communities refused to accept. In such instances, local authorities decide upon sites where resi-
dents are least likely to oppose such developments, which a 1984 report for the California Waste
Management Board suggested would be ‘rural communities, poor communities, communities
whose residents have low educational levels . . . and whose residents were employed in
resource-extractive jobs’ (Cole and Foster 2002:3).
A poor relationship between a community and a government may also manifest itself in the
state’s refusal to recognise a community’s rights. In the case of Timika, West Papua, Indonesia,
the state protected the rights of corporations over the local Amungme and Kamoro commu-
nities. The mining enterprise Freeport McMoran (major holder Rio Tinto) was granted the de
facto role of government as a result of the contract it signed with the Indonesian government
in 1966. The contract gave Freeport broad powers over local communities and resources,
including the right to take, on a tax-free basis, land, timber, water, and other natural resources,
and to resettle indigenous inhabitants with compensation required only for dwellings and per-
manent improvements. Compensation was not required for the loss of hunting and fishing
grounds, water supplies, or damage to livelihoods (Abrash 2001). Having undermined indigen-
ous rights vis-a`-vis Freeport, the state also intervened to prevent the communities’ attempts to
seek justice by, for example, using force to prevent a lawyer meeting with local clients in 1996,
preventing an indigenous activist from travelling to London to raise awareness at Rio Tinto’s
AGM, and in the violent repression of demonstrations (Abrash 2001).
Sometimes scrutiny by an international institution of a state’s conduct in the areas of human
rights and environment, for example, can generate pressure to recognise a community’s grie-
vances. Equally, however, state dependence upon loans from institutions such as the World
Bank or the IMF, whose loan conditionalities require export-led industrialisation, often pro-
vides incentives to promote industrial expansion at the expense of social and environmental
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safeguards. Hence, while international pressure achieved some progress in gaining government
recognition of traditional land rights of the U’wa people in their decade-long struggle against
Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) in Colombia, these gains are potentially undermined
by IMF pressure on the Colombian government to speed up oil production (Izquierdo 2001).
Similarly, in Sri Lanka, IMF loan conditionalities that mandate changes in workers’ rights,
including the replacement of tripartite wage boards with productivity councils and the introduc-
tion of a 14-day notice of strike action, threaten to further undermine the campaign by free-trade
zone (FTZ) workers to gain government and business recognition of their rights to collective
bargaining (Marcus and Dent 2001).
Nevertheless, states have a range of instruments they can use to demand greater transparency
and answerability from corporations, including rules regarding disclosure of information and
citizens’ corresponding rights to information, should they choose to do so. The level of state
commitment to making such data available and the access of poorer groups to the necessary
mechanisms may be limited, however, with its concomitant implications for their effectiveness
as an accountability tool. Without mechanisms making the provision of information, such as
industrial chemical use, compulsory and routine, people may unknowingly ‘work, live, and
play’, to coin a phrase from the environmental justice movement, in hazardous conditions.
Without such information, people may not realise that their rights have been violated until
harm has already been done. For example, the US government was actively complicit with
uranium mining companies in keeping information regarding the significant health risks
posed by uranium mining hidden from mine workers in Utah and Arizona from the 1940s to
the 1960s. The deliberate suppression of this information prevented the workers from
seeking environmental justice from the mining companies that were not implementing safe ven-
tilation procedures. Limited compensation for damages was granted only in the 1990s, after
decades of campaigning by Navajo community groups (Brugge et al. 2001).
Again, mechanisms of enforceability are central to ensuring that demands for information are
met. According to Greenpeace, many workers and villagers were exposed to mercury as a result
of toxic vapour and effluent emissions from the Unilever subsidiary Hindustan Lever Ltd (HLL)
mercury thermometer production plant at Kodaikanal in Tamil Nadu over an 18-year period.
HLL disputed the claims. In October 2001, it closed down the Kodaikanal factory and trans-
ferred its operations to Gujarat. The company had previously refused to give ex-workers
their health records and opposed the undertaking of an independent health or environmental
survey. Such information is necessary in order for the community to consider whether it can
obtain remedy for the health and environmental damage caused by mercury pollution in the
area (Greenpeace International 2002:49–50).1 A lack of transparency about the decision-
making process, and who is responsible for what, can further undermine attempts by commu-
nities to influence decisions. In Siberut, Indonesia, the Tiop community was not given answers
to its question regarding which authorities were responsible for monitoring company activities
and withdrawing permits, and why logging permits had been issued at all on the UNESCO-
designated ‘Man and Biosphere’ reserve. This lack of transparency facilitated the granting of
illegal permits to outside companies posing as small-scale local Mentawaian cooperatives on
the island of Siberut (DTE 2001).
In this regard, legal frameworks can provide a vital political mechanism for defining rights
and allocating responsibilities that are key to the practice of accountability. They can create
an enabling environment for accountability where laws governing access to key resources,
determining economic entitlements, and shaping the rules of participation in public life are
clarified and institutionalised. However, legal frameworks do not provide a ‘neutral’ space
and may favour some to the exclusion of others. Legal frameworks can determine the level
of requirements regarding corporate disclosure, the level of consultation in which corporations
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must engage citizens regarding proposed developments, and the level of recognition accorded
to the entitlements of different groups—for example concerning communal land rights. What
remains crucial, however, is how usable and accessible such frameworks and the accompanying
procedures are for poorer and marginalised groups.
Native American communities in the US state of Wisconsin successfully used legal treaties and
their sovereign status in 1997 to oppose Exxon and Rio Algom’s proposed development of a zinc
and copper mine near their reserves. They benefited from federal government support for the
development of a tribal water regulatory authority, giving them the power to regulate proposed
developments affecting their environment. The existence of sovereign rights for tribal peoples
provided an essential legal framework for ensuring CA in this instance. Conversely, states have
been able to use colonial legislation to override more progressive legal provisions that benefit
communities. The Mining Act in Kenya, for example, facilitated the compulsory appropriation
of indigenous lands by the government without adequate protection of customary land ownership.
The law was successfully invoked despite the existence of newer, more progressive legislation such
as the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 1999 (EMCA), due to the government’s
lack of commitment to its full implementation (Ojiambo 2002:17).
Litigation can provide a state-based channel for redress by communities afflicted by irrespon-
sible investment. In the case of Kettleman City, despite local government support for granting
the permit to the company, the fact that legal requirements had not been met allowed citizens to
use litigation to prevent this going ahead, on the basis of procedural failures. However, the
effectiveness of such strategies varies, and issues of cost, high legal literacy requirements,
and intimidation often conspire to exclude poorer citizens from access to legal redress. In
addition, the outcomes that are possible through litigation are often narrow and ill placed,
in and of themselves, to uphold the rights of communities. Compensation that is reduced to a
financial payout does not address livelihood alternatives that have been diminished by an indus-
try’s activities. This was the case with the Ok Tedi mining project in Papua New Guinea, for
example, where it is claimed that compensation packages failed to take account of the loss
of traditional livelihood options such as fishing that had been damaged by the activities of
the BHP mining company (Kirsch 1996).
Company-related factors
There are a number of company-related factors that influence the effectiveness of community-
based strategies for CA. With regard to corporate–community relations, some of the traditional
mechanisms of accountability and participation associated with the state are not applicable,
since corporations clearly do not have the same ‘democratic duty’ or means of dealing with con-
flicting rights-based claims (Newell 2002). Here, we focus on three company-related factors that
are important in determining the effectiveness of community-based strategies for CA: (a) the
multiple levels at which corporate power operates; (b) the vulnerability of different types of cor-
poration to particular strategies; and (c) a corporation’s approach to citizen participation.
First, the financial power of companies can be used to counter a number of sanctions that com-
munities may take against them. Companies can invest considerable sums of money in PR cam-
paigns to defend themselves against negative publicity; fund scientific studies countering claims
made against them; and ensure that the company has ‘the best’ legal advice when faced with liti-
gation. Retaliatory legal action also serves to deter potential plaintiffs from bringing cases in the
first place. In the Californian town of Buttonwillow, Kern County, the company Laidlaw and
county-level authorities sued the Buttonwillow residents for legal expenses after the community
had already lost a legal challenge against the expansion of the Laidlaw toxic-waste dump situated
near their town (Cole and Foster 2002). Companies have also made use of SLAPPs
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(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) to muzzle criticism of their operations. A
Filipino doctor who stated in a conference that the possible carcinogenicity of a Hoechst pesticide
could not be categorically ruled out was ‘SLAPPed’ with a legal suit accusing him of ‘wilfully and
falsely stating that Thiodan causes cancer’ (Rowell 1996:280). (The court dismissed the suit.)
The threat of relocation is also used as a bargaining resource by companies who pit commu-
nities’ employment needs against their demands for improved levels of social and environ-
mental protection. When campaigners in Kenya sought to engage Tiomin in a dialogue on
issues including adequate compensation for people with customary land titles, and environ-
mental protection measures, the company responded with threats to pull out of the area
altogether (Ojiambo 2002:33). Capital mobility and the possibility of relocation provides
many companies with significant leverage over less mobile labour, contributing to the silencing
of accountability demands in the first place or citing political mobilisation as an excuse for a
company to relocate its operations. For example, Mitsubishi was able to evade international
demands for more ‘responsible’ behaviour in its Malaysian plant by shutting this plant down
and reopening in China (Karliner 1997). The US-based Allied Signal Seat Belt Company
used mobility to its advantage as it transferred its operations between communities in the
southern US states and Mexico. According to Gaventa, the company used the threat and
reality of plant closings and layoffs ‘as a tool for “economic blackmail” and bargaining for
labour concessions’ (Gaventa 1990).
The use of expert knowledge to deny accountability claims is another tool companies use to
resist communities’ demands. Resort to official scientific practices often works in favour of
status quo power relations, disempowering poorer groups with lower levels of education, less
access to information, and reduced ability to engage with elite terms of debate. This makes it
difficult for communities to make a ‘scientific’ case against a corporation to support claims
of negligence, especially where the burden of proof rests with an under-resourced and politi-
cally marginalised community. In broader contests over the benefits and disadvantages of pro-
posed projects, strategically useful discursive devices are also used to describe the forms of
knowledge employed by oppositional groups and the livelihoods upon which they rely as ‘back-
ward’, ‘undeveloped’, and ‘unproductive’. The incentives given to large livestock-raising and
timber companies in the Brazilian Amazon, for instance, were justified on the basis that latex
extraction and nut harvesting by traditional populations were ‘backward’ economic activities,
and failed to use the area sufficiently (Diegus 1998:58). As harbingers of ‘modernisation’ and
‘development’, corporations construct their activities as intrinsically beneficial to local commu-
nities, the economy, and society as a whole, while the negative aspects of such developments
are seen as unfortunate but necessary trade-offs. Such an attitude was expressed, for example, in
the refusal by Golden Star Resources, the holder of 30 per cent of the Omai Gold Mine in
Guyana, to compensate local residents for the effects of a major cyanide spill on drinking
water, livestock, and wildlife. The company claimed that such accidents ‘are one of the
many risks of doing business’ (Greenpeace International 2002:92).
In terms of contesting these claims, it is clear that some companies are more vulnerable to
citizen action than others. Whether a company is transnational or nationally based, public or
private, and what sector it is based in, all appear to have a bearing on its responsiveness. For
example, because of their vulnerability to international scrutiny, TNCs may be more likely
than national corporations to respond to community-based strategies. National companies
may be protected from sanctions to some degree if they have close ties to the national govern-
ment. The government of India’s commitment to the flagship company NTPC (National
Thermal Power Corporation), for example, helps to explain its lack of intervention in conflicts
with local communities over claims of livelihood destruction and environmental contamination
(Newell 2003). The extent to which a company is an exporter and its overall position within the
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supply chain also determine its vulnerability to buyer-driven standards of social and environ-
mental protection and, of course, to consumer pressure. Pratt and Fintel (2002) found that
leading firms in Costa Rica that were producing for the export market were more likely to
have improved some aspect of their environmental policy than those producing for the domestic
market. This effect is related to pressures on firms lower down the commodity chains to adopt
higher standards in order to export to international markets (Utting 2002b). This is consistent
with Vogel’s argument that exporters’ desire to reach key markets in Europe and North
America, for example, serves to drive standards up as these regions require higher levels of
social and environmental performance (Vogel 1997).
Where their shareholder base is more diversified and their operations are based in countries
that are home to influential NGOs active on environment and development issues, companies
are more likely to find their global operations subject to scrutiny. The extent to which
firms are based in countries with strong traditions of corporate governance can also be import-
ant. Zadek (2001:30) notes that ‘[t]he emerging, dominant forms of global corporate citizenship
are . . . deeply influenced by Anglo-American (US or UK) practice’. Greenpeace claims that
Shell Brazil SA responded to demands for it to buy ranches from local people whose land
had been contaminated by the company, not as a result of pressure from the local authorities
and community but due to its vulnerability to negative international publicity, including the
sending of a critical report about the company to the ‘FTSE4good’ ethical investment index
(Greenpeace International 2002:41). Shareholders and financial backers may exert greater
leverage over corporations than do communities themselves, something which explains why
campaigners, for example, buy shares and attend AGMs, or lobby shareholders in AGMs
(Marinetto 1998). Campaigns likely to be most successful are those targeted against areas of
negligible value to the overall operations of the company, playing on the ‘hassle factor’, so
that the potential for reduced profits and damaged reputation in other, more important,
markets makes the targeted operation a liability (Rodman 1998). Clearly, TNCs are not
always vulnerable to these forms of international and consumer pressure. For instance, while
Tiomin Resources Inc. was considered a ‘giant’ in Kenya, with potential to bring in much
needed FDI, the Canadian government’s Mines and Geology department told campaigners
against the mine that ‘Tiomin and titanium does not exist on our radar’ (Ojiambo 2002:26).
The distinct histories and cultures of firms also shape their perceptions of their responsibilities
to the communities in which they invest; their view of the importance of community relations for
long-term profitability; and their attitude towards community participation. The stance of
corporations on these issues ranges from a position of non-engagement to reactive responses
to demanded spaces through to more explicit commitments to formal ‘invited’ spaces for com-
munity participation. In many of the case studies companies showed little or no willingness to
negotiate with the community affected by their investments. For example, PT Inco in Indonesia
has shown an indifferent attitude to citizen participation. In 1994, when Inco announced the
construction of two new hydro plants at Soroako, there was no public review process, no pub-
lished environmental or social impact assessment, and no consultation between the company and
local people. PT Inco also demonstrated that community relations were not a priority when it
cancelled a meeting with residents of Soroako who were campaigning for the company to
honour agreements it had made regarding compensation for lands taken in 1973 (Moody 1999).
In other cases, companies have taken a more proactive approach to engaging communities in
negotiations from the outset of a project, often a response to previous negative publicity regard-
ing their activities. In the development of a proposed mine in Evatra, Madagascar, the UK-
based mining company Rio Tinto engaged in a multi-pronged approach to improve its
damaged reputation, conducting a thorough environmental impact assessment (EIA) and
social report (involving a public consultation), setting up a biodiversity research station, and
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making much of the research material available in the public domain (Mulligan 1999:53). How
corporations respond to community demands is also, of course, a function of how well mobi-
lised a community is. For instance the Innu and Innuit opponents of proposed mining at
Voisey’s Bay in Canada were well organised, had previous experience of campaigning
against low-level flying, and were also in negotiations with the government regarding the lega-
lisation of indigenous land rights. Strategies included successfully negotiating with the
company that discovered the mineral resources, Diamond Field Resources (DFR), whose pre-
sident met with Innu representatives (Innes 2001).
Community-related factors
While a lack of financial resources, political marginalisation from decision-making processes,
and dependence upon industries clearly inhibit communities’ ability to hold corporations to
account, communities may be able to exercise other forms of power. Beyond micro strategies
of resistance, or ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985), other work draws attention to the import-
ance of a vocal and well-organised civil society to broader strategies of CA. It is argued here
that (a) community ‘powerlessness’ on a number of levels; (b) the diversity of community live-
lihood options; (c) intra-community dynamics; and (d) the nature of the relationship between
communities and ‘external’ actors who claim to represent them, affect both the responsiveness
of companies to community strategies and the representation of communities in spaces for
citizen participation and in campaigns themselves.
Politically marginalised communities often lack the support of governments, which instead
pander to more powerful coalitions and constituencies that may well have an interest in protect-
ing a corporation. In addition, the repeated experience of being left out of decision making, and
a lack of skills, confidence, and resources with which to negotiate effectively, often prevent
poorer communities from being able to take advantage of spaces for negotiation that do
exist. Where corporations have created spaces for participation, weaker sections of the commu-
nity may be excluded or under-represented. Barrientos and Orton (1999) show how negotiations
between unions and companies over labour codes often fail to involve some of the poorest sec-
tions of the workforce that are not adequately represented by the union, such as seasonal and
women workers. Similarly, according to Mulligan, Rio Tinto’s programme to engage with
the local community in Madagascar did not include people who had no legal title to land
(Mulligan 1999), thus excluding the most marginalised groups in the communities affected
by the proposed titanium mine. Even where communities secure recognition of their rights,
they often lack the power to enforce agreements made with the company. For example, in
the case of PT Inco in Soroako, Indonesia, the company failed to honour agreements reached
with the community in 1979 (Moody 1999). While strategies of negotiation may provide effec-
tive mechanisms of answerability, a community’s lack of power often undermines its ability to
secure effective mechanisms of enforceability.
We noted above how a lack of literacy and technical skills can reduce the ability of commu-
nities both to engage in meaningful dialogue with corporations and to challenge them about the
impact of their activities. Strategies of ‘worker’ or ‘barefoot’ epidemiology have been used to
counter this exclusion (Merrifield 1993). Residents of Yellow Creek in the US state of Kentucky
suspected that Middlesboro Tanning Company was polluting a local river, thereby affecting
their health. The residents carried out their own health survey, which served to draw public
attention to the issue. The survey also provided the community with information it had not
had before, providing a potential platform for future campaigning.
Communities often also seek to amplify their power through building alliances with other
actors and movements that may be in a better position to exert leverage over a corporation.
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For example, in their opposition to the Ok Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea, the Yonggom acti-
vists’ role in building a network of international allies was pivotal in generating negative inter-
national publicity for Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (BHP), which eventually agreed to
a substantial out-of-court settlement (Kirsch 1996). It is important, however, not to overlook the
extent to which community-based strategies can be effective in challenging corporate power in
their own right. For example, the success of the Marı´a Elena Cuadra Women’s Movement in
Nicaragua in helping to secure the passage of a locally developed code of conduct as national
law in 1998 was a result of local and national campaigning (Green 1998).
Communities have also sought to reduce their dependency on a corporation by constructing
alternative livelihoods. In Forest County, Wisconsin, an alliance among Native American
groups from three local reservations managed to generate alternative employment by becoming
‘one of the biggest employers’ in the area. This helped to reduce demand for mining jobs from
the wider community, who had originally been potential supporters of the mining development
(Grossman and Gedicks 2001). Often, however, generating alternatives is not a realistic option.
In Bangladesh, the lack of alternative employment for tannery workers and the competition even
for such hazardous jobs, meant that the workers had no bargaining position. For this reason,
workers in the Nur Bhai tannery were initially opposed to attempts by an NGO to initiate dia-
logue with the company on safety and environmental issues, fearing that the company might
close the operation in response to their demands (Asia Foundation, n.d.). Examples given
above of companies relocating under pressure to commit resources to higher social and environ-
mental standards suggest that these fears are often justified. To counter this, groups have devel-
oped strategies that seek to prevent companies playing workers off each other. One strategy,
aimed at forging solidarity between workers in Mexico and in the Appalachian south, has
been the organisation of study tours so that ‘women who had lost their jobs in the Appalachian
region could visit their counterparts who had gained similar jobs in . . . the maquiladora region
of Mexico’ (Gaventa 1999:33). Similarly, US and Mexican participants learned about the enor-
mous job losses in Canada that resulted from corporations moving south to the USA to avoid
unions and generous social benefits. They noted that ‘Dialogues among US workers around
NAFTA abounded with stories of how, in bargaining sessions, management would often use
the threat of moving production to Mexico or elsewhere to bargain down wages and working
conditions in the United States’ (Cavanagh et al. 2001:153).
The heterogeneity of communities as non-bounded groups with differing interests and
imbued with relations of power has a number of implications for the effectiveness of commu-
nity-based strategies. Problems relating to industrial pollution, for example, may be experi-
enced differently by different groups within a community. The Lote-Parshuram industrial
development in the Indian state of Maharashtra arguably had most impact upon Dalits and
women (Anand n.d.:17). Lower-caste (Dalit) landless agricultural workers received no compen-
sation for loss of livelihood, whereas landowners did. While men lost fishing and agricultural
livelihood options to pollution, unlike many women they had the opportunity to work in the new
industries. Conflicting attitudes within a community towards the benefits of industrial develop-
ment allow corporations to focus on those people willing to cooperate, and to dismiss or ignore
more confrontational views. For example, a legal case brought against Tiomin Resources Inc. in
Kenya on the grounds of inadequate compensation for lands acquired by the company divided
the affected community. Tiomin capitalised on this and began to work with those who were dis-
satisfied with the legal approach (Ojiambo 2002:20). Who is willing, and who is able, to take
advantage of ‘invited’ spaces for participation in corporate decision making is also dependent
upon relations of power within communities. For example, Village Electrical Committees
(VECs) set up by the electricity company WESCO in Kerala, India, to engage stakeholders
were dominated by men and members of the scheduled castes (Barney et al. 2001).
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NGOs and unions can also perform representational functions in these settings, though ques-
tions about their own accountability immediately arise. In a number of cases, the involvement
of NGOs has served to reduce the responsiveness of corporations to community campaigns. For
example, the Western Mining Corporation (WMC) was able to use the fact that a number of
‘external’ environmental groups, including the Conservation Council and Friends of the
Earth, were closely involved with aboriginal opponents of the development of the Olympic
Dam mine in South Australia to question the legitimacy of the campaign. The company
objected to negotiating with groups on the basis that they were ‘cronies’ of the environmental
NGOs, even though the majority of the community representatives favoured the NGOs’ stance
on the mine (Ali 2000:88). There are also issues of how inclusive NGOs are of different
elements of a local population on whose behalf they are bargaining. In Wavecrest, South
Africa, opposition to a proposed heavy mineral mine came both from within the affected
Xhosa tribes within the area and also from the Wildlife and Environment Society, a national
NGO (Hamann 2001). While the community position on the mine was divided, in its campaign
against the proposed development—to which community opposition gave credibility and legiti-
macy—Hamman claims that the NGO presented a misleading image of a community united
against the mine (Hamann 2001). Thus, there is a balance to strike between the benefits and
risks of NGO involvement in community campaigns.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated how a number of interrelated contexts influence the effectiveness
of community-based strategies for CA to the poor. These demonstrate both the numerous chal-
lenges communities face in holding to account institutions that affect their lives, and the range
of innovative strategies that have been employed to confront these challenges. It has been
argued that accountability—in terms of answerability and enforceability—is influenced by a
number of interrelated factors concerning the state, the company, and the community in ques-
tion. These factors do not have a hierarchy of relevance, but rather work in conjunction with one
another. For example, where there is a lack of state support for community rights, or where the
rights of corporations are protected at the expense of their responsibilities, the relationship
between the community and the company takes on more importance.
These findings help to support an emerging critical agenda about the prospects and limit-
ations of CSR in the South (Newell 2003; Lund-Thomsen 2003). They also confirm many of
the lessons from the accountability literature about the importance of law, horizontal and ver-
tical mechanisms of accountability, and combinations of formal and informal strategies for
securing answerability and enforceability (Newell and Bellour 2002). Given the multi-
directionality of the webs of accountability we have described in this paper, the success of
community-based strategies for CA is conditional upon the right combination of contexts
and strategies being adopted by other state, civil society, and corporate actors. The factors
that influence the effectiveness of CA to the poor are multiple, complex, and tightly inter-
connected. Community-based strategies are therefore necessarily diverse, multi-pronged, and
contingent upon the particular, context-specific balance between political, economic, and
social factors.
This paper does not, therefore, set out a neat checklist of factors of effectiveness partnered
with strategies. Rather, it identifies a series of state-based, company-based, and community-
based factors that help to account for the extent to which and the ways in which community-
based strategies for CA appear to be effective. This brings to debates on CSR, therefore, a
clearer sense of the everyday contexts in which people in a majority of settings worldwide
are fighting to secure accountability from investors, with whom they are engaging on an
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increasing basis. The findings of this paper, based on the ‘factor framework’ we have devel-
oped, are merely a starting point for what we hope will be an important and timely research
agenda centred on how the poor may seek to develop their own strategies and mechanisms
of accountability from the corporations with and for whom they work.
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Note
1 In October 2004, invoking the ‘polluter pays’ principle, India’s Supreme Court Monitoring Committee
on Hazardous Waste instructed the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board to collect a Rs50-crore (over
E8.5 million) fine from HLL as a revolving bank guarantee to undertake clean-up operations in Kodai-
kanal. HLL was also asked to set up health clinics to assist local residents affected by mercury poisoning
(Vackayil 2004).
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